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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1083 
____________ 
 
JOHN E. REARDON, 
    Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
VIRGINIA E. REARDON; VINCENT D. SEGAL; 
SEGAL & TROPP; ROBERT W. PAGE 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 84-cv-03696) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 24, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed April 6, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant John Reardon filed a civil rights action for damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 83, 
in September, 1984 against his ex-wife, her matrimonial lawyer, and a New Jersey state 
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court judge who was presiding over Reardon’s divorce proceedings.  The case was 
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint against the state court judge, the late Robert W. Page, in 
March, 1985 on the basis that judges are absolutely immunized from a suit for money 
damages arising from their judicial acts.  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per 
curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978).  Reardon sought 
reconsideration of this order in the district court and he sought to amend his complaint, 
all to no avail.  Judgment was entered against Reardon in March, 1986. 
 At issue now, on August 18, 2010, Reardon filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to reopen 
the judgment and a motion to amend his complaint.  He sought reopening of his federal 
civil rights case in order to address the issue of judicial bias as it related to the state trial 
judge and his exercise of jurisdiction over Reardon’s divorce proceedings.  Reardon 
contended that he only recently discovered that the state trial judge acted without 
jurisdiction in his divorce case.  Specifically, Mrs. Reardon was the judge’s clerk and 
thus the judge was not impartial.  Reardon contended that the state judge issued custody 
and child support orders in the absence of jurisdiction because, by law, he should have 
recused himself.  Because the state judge acted in the absence of jurisdiction, the doctrine 
of absolute immunity did not apply.  Although his children are now adults, Reardon 
sought in his proposed amended complaint to relitigate the issues giving rise to the child 
support order, and the order granting physical custody of the children to his ex-wife, and 
he sought money damages.  The Office of the Attorney General for the State of New 
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Jersey answered the motion, and argued that it had not been filed within a reasonable 
time as required by Rule 60(b). 
In an order entered on December 13, 2010, the District Court denied the Rule 
60(b) motion as untimely filed.  The court ruled that 24 years is not a reasonable time 
under Rule 60(c)(1).  The court noted that Reardon consented to the federal court’s 
jurisdiction and was properly served with the defendants’ pleadings, and thus Rule 
60(c)(1) applied to him even though he alleged that the judgment was void, cf. United 
States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2000) (where 
incarcerated claimant received constitutionally inadequate notice of judicial forfeiture 
proceedings, judgment was void, and government could not assert doctrine of laches as 
defense to claimant’s motion for relief from judgment).  The District Court denied 
Reardon’s motion to amend the complaint as moot. 
 Reardon appeals.  Our Clerk advised him that the appeal was subject to summary 
affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to submit 
argument in writing, and he has done so.  We have carefully considered that submission.
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 
I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no 
substantial question is presented by the appeal.  An order denying a Rule 60(b)(4) motion 
is subject to plenary review.  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 and n.5 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Rule 60(b)(4) permits the reopening of a judgment “if the judgment is 
void.”  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(4).  The federal court judgment rendered in Reardon’s 
case in September, 1986 is not void.  The District Court was not without jurisdiction to 
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enter judgment in Reardon’s federal civil rights case because Reardon initiated the suit, 
because federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 actions, and 
because the court did not exceed its power.  See Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. 
Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 67-68 (1st Cir. 2003) (judgment is void, as opposed to 
voidable, when the rendering court lacked either subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
over the defendant’s person, and when rendering court’s actions exceeded the proper 
exercise of judicial power so as to violate the Due Process Clause).  Reardon alleges that 
the District Court erred in applying the doctrine of absolute immunity to his case, see 
Supplement to Motion, at 2-3, but this is an allegation of legal error only; it is not an 
allegation that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over his section 1983 action such that 
the judgment rendered is void.
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 We point this out because the reasonable time requirement does not apply to a 
motion to reopen a void judgment.  One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 157.  In 
One Toshiba Color Television, the default judgment actually was void because it was 
entered without proper service of the complaint.  See id. at 156.  Here, the federal court 
judgment plainly was not void, and we doubt, as did the District Court, that Reardon may 
circumvent the reasonable time requirement of Rule 60(b) by raising a frivolous legal 
argument that the judgment is void.  See Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore, 316 F.3d at 68-
69 (defects in mortgage foreclosure proceeding were technical in nature and did not 
                                              
 
1
 If it was Reardon’s intent to use Rule 60(b) to attack the state court judgment, we 
have previously held that he may not use Rule 60(b) to reopen a state court judgment.  
See Reardon v. Leason, 2010 WL 4488241 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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evince a usurpation of power such as might render the district court’s judgment 
confirming sale void and subject to attack at any time). 
 In any event, as a motion brought under subparagraph (4) of Rule 60(b), timely or 
not, Reardon’s request to reopen the judgment because it is void plainly lacks merit and 
properly was denied.
2
  To the extent Reardon was alleging newly discovered evidence, 
see id. at subparagraph (2) (judgment may be reopened for “newly discovered evidence 
that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b)”), or exceptional circumstances, see id. at subparagraph (6); 
Martinez-McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(only extraordinary circumstances warrant granting 60(b) relief, because legal error 
ordinarily can be corrected on appeal), his Rule 60(b) motion was untimely, because it 
was filed more than 24 years after the challenged judgment was entered.  Under Rule 
60(c)(1)(A), a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time -- and 
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order 
or the date of the proceeding.”  Twenty-four years is not a reasonable time for Rule 60(b) 
purposes.  See Moolenaar v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir.1987) 
(two years not “reasonable time” for 60(b) purposes). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Reardon’s Rule 60(b) motion. 
                                              
 
2
 We may affirm a result reached by the District Court for any reason as long as the 
record supports the judgment. See Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 
1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983). 
